The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interests

IntroductionThe semipolitical uprisings in the Arab land during 2011 undeniably transformed the place eastern and the North of Africa (MENA) (Dalacoura, 2012 63). An fickle mix of deepening political grievances and a series of socio- scotch problems, much(prenominal) as high unemployment, especially among youth, corruption, internal domainal and kind inequalities, and the deterioration of scotch conditions were the special K causal f personationor behind all the uprisings (ibid 66-67).externally, these uprisings retain had scholarly consequences for the pursuit of long-standing linked States (U.S.) constitution goals and interests in the share, with regard to characteral auspices, slide fastener supplies, phalanx access, bi subsequental trade and investiture, counter-proliferation, counterterrorism, and the promotion of human rights (Arieff et al. 2012). The profound diverges in the region may alter the framework in which these goals be act and challenge the basic assumptions that fool long guided U.S. policies in the outside(a) dust (Keiswetter, 2012 1). Regionally, the contagious nature of the uprisings, which started in Tunisia in December 2010 and later on spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain or Syria (Dalacoura, 2012 63), led either to the oerthrow of dictators or to internal fracturing (ibid 66). turn Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Tunisia to a lower placewent troubled transitions away from despotical regimes, in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, menial protests produced tentative steps toward correct (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 41).In view of such differences, polity makers in the U.S. have adopted case-by-case (and highly unequal) approaches, which range from unsounded support to outright war machine intervention (Shore, 2012). For instance, in countries such as Yemen or Saudi-Arabian Arabia, the U.S. has turned a blind eye to g everywherenmental corruption and human rights violations. In non-allied countries, how ever so, like Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, the U.S. has condemned dictatorial practices, issued sanctions and stock-still wars in the name of nation (Shore, 2012).It could be argued, thus, that the U.S. response to the events of the Arab flush has been cautious and at odds(p) at the same time. On the one(a) hand, Obamas organization has been criticized for its unembellished lack of a coherent approach, and its instinctiveness to talk of participatory ideals while protect national interests. On the some otherwise hand, supporters have praised both the pragmatism and convention as a smart approach to supranational affairs (Kitchen, 2012 53). at heart this framework, this paper leave behind assess the meet of the so- inflicted Arab funk on the US objectives regarding political and frugal reform prospects for the oculus eastern United States quiescence negotiations, energy issues, and warrantor concerns. The main hypothesis of this paper is, thus, that as get going of the current inter national arrangement, where the imagination of security acquires multiple and to a greater extent labyrinthine dimensions that go beyond military terms, the U.S. policies in the center field easterly argon extremely shy and cautious. This paper argues that this frank cautiousness and what m either call a contradictory foreign policy of the U.S. is the result of a series of economic interests to maintain oil- courses and global security concerns that loafernot be forgotten in the political international arena. The U.S., thus, faces the difficult position of supporting its ideal of democracy and value on the one hand, and its long-term interests and security concerns on the other.This essay, thus, is divide up in 2 main sections. On the one hand, a legal brief metaphysical background on International Relations (IR) theories give overhaul as a basis to understand the penurys and approaches of the U.S. foreign policy in the region. On the other hand, an psychoanalysis o f the old and current U.S. interests and policies in the substance eastbound will reveal the contradictions and concerns of the current U.S. boldness and the possible outcomes.Foreign constitution through the Lenses of International RelationsIn club to understand the U.S. foreign policy in the international outline and more specifically in the middle East, with its extensive encompassing spectrum of foreign policy decisions, this paper shall approach the issue from the theoretical framework of International Relations (IR) (Vale, 2012 6).The International SystemThe international system, driven chiefly by states, power, and anarchy, has had a profound effect on the United States since its foundation (Vale, 2012 8).It could be said that there are three main opposite forms of the international system the multipolar, the bipolar and the unipolar system. Tin the multipolar system, there are some(prenominal) great powers influencing international politics and competing for domi nance (Vale, 2012 10). Bipolar systems, could be described as a battle of titans of sorts as it happened between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold fight-, namely, where two major powers oppose one another for dominance in the system. Finally, the unipolar system, is when there is one might and no other major powers in the international system such as the Roman Empire or the United States after the coin of the Soviet Union until arguably the beginning of the 2003 War in Iraq (ibid 10).It feces be said that contemporary international politics does not rival whatever of these models. Nevertheless, during the last decade a newfound structure seems to have appeared the uni-multipolar system. This system has a single world superpower only(prenominal) with several major powers around it in the system which constrains the superpower so that it suffernot act as if it were within a unipolar international system (Vale, 2012 10). nigh authors, like Huntington, a rgue that this scenario is closest one to the current international system where the settlement of international issues requires action by the single superpower, the United States, but always with some combination of other major states (1999).Indeed, 21st one C scholarship within IR moves away from the primacy of the state and second dispositionliness analyses towards the relationship that individuals have within the international system. This intellectual movement reflects experiences in international history that diminish the role of the state and reinforce the human race and humanity into the heart of a discipline whose origins lie in the motivation for action. This remove is a 21st century phenomenon with experiential roots in the terror attacks of 9/11, the Global Financial Crisis, the Arab trammel uprisings, and the rise of hacktivism. These global, historical experiences are fostering the rise of cutting-edge and subverter IR conjecture that embraces complexity and m ultidisciplinarity (Oprisko, 2013). In other words, the trend within IR guess is mirroring the shared experiences of the 21st century renewed emphasis on terror, revolutions against discrimination and social-immobility, and the success of hacktivism (ibid.).According to the Neoclassical Realism theory of IR, the international system determines how states act and behave towards each other because the international system is anarchical and states compete for spatial relation quo power (Rose, 1998146). In other words, the scope and aspiration of a countrys foreign policy is driven source and fore just about by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities (ibid.). The 21st degree centigrade, however, is tag not with the political maneuvering of great states with competing visions, but with the elite few accumulating power, on the one hand, and the general public, rejecting such elitism, on the other. The first movement towa rd a revision of the billet quo interpretation of the international system was the 9-11 terrorist attacks. The reaction against this new kind of enemy and the war on terrorism exemplified an important reengagement with the social contract the state, the sovereign authority of the people, was no longer the only indie actor in the international political arena (Oprisko, 2013).Closely related to to the development of the above-mentioned new enemies there is the change of the security concept during the last decades. Authors such as Ole Waever or Barry Buzan were some of the most rife constructivists who de elegant security after the Cold War, which included non-traditional elements such as human rights (Layman, 2012 4).The place of human rights in security is widely debated. Although to begin with the Cold War security was traditionally defined in military terms, since Realism was the main school of thought, Constructivism argued for contrasting perspectives, permitting the most thorough comment for security and national interests due to its ability to allow for change in the perception of what defines threats (Layman, 2012 6).Indeed, as Barry Buzan argues, social norms and cultural phenomena dictate what is a security threat (Layman, 2012 6). Waever and Buzan define security as perceived threats to some(prenominal)thing such as the traditional view of a state to non-traditional views of threats (Buzan et al. 1998 7) which include society, the environment, and economic laws. Threats are, thus, divided into different sectors the military sector, bear on with the armed capabilities of a state the political sector, concerned with the stability of a state the economic sector, concerned with the availableness to resources and the market the societal sector, concerned with the security and sustainability of culture and the environmental sector, concerned with the security of resources (Layman, 2012 8).Thus, the Financial Crisis in 2008 and the subsequent aus terity endured by common citizens hit a breaking-point with the suicide of Tarek al-Tayeb Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia in 2010. Dignity-filled rage erupted crosswise four continents as the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East and North Africa and Occupy protests engulfed Europe and North America (Oprisko, 2013). As we relegate from the competing idealist traditions of the 20th Century, the emphasis from structural impositions are waning (ibid.). gentleman social agents and social structures are mutually constitutive, and social change send word proceed causally in both directions simultaneously from agents to structures and from structures to agents (Ben webt, 2003 489)U.S. Contradictory Approach to the Middle EastBearing in mind the previously described theoretical framework, the core American national interests at stake in the Middle East over decades should not come as a surprise namely protect the U.S. homeland from the threats international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction ensuring the free flow of oil, vital to the U.S., regional, and global economies ensuring the security of Israel (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48) discouraging interstate conflict that can threaten allies and other interests ensuring transit and access to facilities to support U.S. military operations countering terrorism and stemming the proliferation of weapons (Arieff et al., 2012 1).Over the years, these interests have resulted a series of U.S. policy objectives advancing ArabIsraeli peace, protecting key oil-producing states, limiting the spread of regional conflicts, or ensuring U.S. military access and freedom of action within the region. Consequently, to come across these objectives, the US has usually behaved as a status quo power in the Middle East, prioritizing the regional balance of power and a certain order over backing political change (ibid).During the past 50 years, the U.S. has contend two dueling roles in the Middle East, that of a promoter of liberal idea ls, willing to wage war to build democracy, and that of a supporter of dictators who adhere to American interests and ensure stability (Shore, 2012). It can be said, thus, that the U.S. reaction to the Arab Spring uprisings has exemplified these two opposing policies. While the US was quick to defend the peaceful protesters in Egypt and oppressed citizens of Libya, taking any infallible measures to prevent gross do-gooder crimes, the U.S. has issued little more than formal warnings to the fact that Syrians are existence killed under Assads rule, Bahrain is cracking down on protestors, and Yemen is moving towards disaster (ibid.).However, the U.S. inscription to stability and the status quo partly sustained the regional stagnant economic, political and social systems, leading to the rise of Islamism and Salafism. by and by failing to overthrow the authoritarian regimes of the region, from the 1990s, terrorism came to focus. Thus, and particularly after the attacks of September 1 1, 2001, the hegemonic interest in the Saudi monarchy -as the largest oil producer- came into conflict with American national security priorities (Kitchen, 2012 54).However, after 9-11 the U.S. fixed that the regions authoritarian regimes were actually the root of the terrorist problem, prescribing, thus, democracy as the solution to the Middle Easts socio-economic issues (Kitchen, 2012 54). Thus, in 2003, the supply Administration launched the immunity Agenda, asserting that stability could not be purchased at the expense of liberty, emphasizing that promoting democracy was not just about promoting American values, but was in the American national interest, since oppressive regimes created the conditions for al-Qaidaization and terrorism (ibid).However, the Freedom Agenda as part of the wider war on terror had obvious contradictions. While on the one hand the US was seeking short counter-terrorism measures through the security apparatus of allied authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, it was prioritizing the long-term emancipation of Middle Eastern societies to address the deeper roots of marginalisation and underdevelopment (Kitchen, 2012 54).It could be argued that these contradictions were the background to the US response to the events of the Arab Spring (Kitchen, 2012 55).The Obama Administration and the U.S. outline In The Middle EastEven though the uprisings and political change in the Arab world have challenged many of the assumptions that have long informed U.S. policy makers, it can be said that many long-standing U.S. goals in the region endure (Arieff et al. 2012 1).The Bush administrations response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, overturned this preference for the status quo. The invasion of Iraq created a power vacuum in the gulf that Iran well-tried to fill. The war exhausted the U.S. military, spread sectarianism and refugees passim the region, and unleashed a cultured war. The Global War on Terror also brought the US into outlying(prenominal) more collaboration with Arab security services (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 48). The Bush administration failed to moderate its rhetoric on democracy with meaningful support for pop change (ibid).The legacies of Obamas predecessors war on terror had to be addressed, in order improve the US credibility and standing in the MENA region (Kitchen, 2012 55). Thus, during President Obamas first term, the U.S. announced its desire for a fresh start with the Muslim world, which started by withdrawing the U.S. military presence from Iraq and scale down the worst excesses of the War on Terror, while maintaining a lower-key counter-terrorism campaign. While the administration has not managed to resolve the Iranian nuclear challenge, it has assembled an international consensus and soaked sanctions to pressure Tehran. Obama also made the peace process a tallness priority, although his efforts proved no more successful than his predecessors. Then the Arab Spring erupte d, reshaping the regional agenda (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).It has been said that the events of the Arab Spring took Obamas Administration by surprise and underprepared (Kitchen, 2012 55). While the political reform was in the overarching interests of the US, and was both sustainable in the region and compatible with Americas other priorities (ibid 56), the color House, however, was worried that over-enthusiastic American support could undermine the revolutions authenticity. Thus, Obamas rhetoric in public was cautious, as he sought to balance competing interests in the circumstance of uncertain events, while at the same time the administration use its long-developed relationships in the region to try to shape developments (ibid.).Egypt constitutes a clear precedent of this delicate situation. While the clear win for the Muslim Brotherhood did not fall within the U.S. s expectations and interests in that country in particular, the hobby military coup, although morally questionabl e (at least in the 21st Century), has exactly been challenged. Indeed, having a military regime that wants to maintain the peace with Israel, is probably the most comfortable option for the U.S. in a region where nothing is colonised so far.Despite the massive changes across the Middle East ever since 2011, there are still several rapidly evolving dynamics that any viable U.S. system mustiness account for. First, the so-called Arab Spring has modify key regional dynamics, regime perceptions of internal and external threats, and the role of different political actors, whereby a mobilized public opinion has an unprecedented role in regional politics. Second, Iranian nuclear and hegemonic ambitions play along to worry its neighbors, Israel, and the West. Third, while base of operations has suffered organizational and political setbacks, its affiliates have adapted in disconcerting ways. Fourth, the IsraeliPalestinian issue continues to be a core element of regional instabili ty and a source of potential violence (Khal and Lynch, 2013 41).The Arab Spring and the US Interests Challenges and OpportunitesIn response to the Arab uprisings, the Obama Administration has taken a reactive approach, trying to jell U.S. regional policies while coping with multiple ongoing crises (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49).In 2011, when addressing the impact of the Arab Spring on U.S. interests, Obama admitted the unsustainability of the status quo and advocated relations based not only on mutual interests and mutual respect but also on a set of principles, including opposition to the use of violence and repression support for a set of universal rights and support for political and economic reform in the MENA region that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region (Keiswetter, 2012 4).However, contradictions were again inevitable. Although the administration recognized the importance of seeking to change in Egypt and across the region, it was quickl y pulled up at the prospect of resistance with Saudi Arabia over a possible political transformation in Bahrain (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Similarly, while the administration recognized the need for democratic change in the region, allowing, thus, the democratic process to develop even when elections produced Islamist victors (as it happened in Tunisia and Egypt), it always resisted calls for a more costly and risky intervention in Syria (ibid.).Despite the Administration embracing democratic reform and public engagement, a workable strategy to implement these principles has yet to be put in place (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 49). Indeed, even when sensible policies were pursued, they have frequently not been communicated strategically, which transmits uncertainty about American priorities in the region.Given the current environment in the Middle East, any attempt to draw a more coherent approach must consider five strategic dilemmasFirst, maintaining the free flow of oil may require robu st security ties with Gulf regimes, which would increase the U.S. dependence on the least democratic and iron-fist ruling governments in the region. This dependence would undermine the U.S. nuts power with the Arab public and may contribute to the emerging SunniShiite Cold War in the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Saudis, among others, have been able to compensate for the disruptions caused by the Libyan events. Thus, a strong US commitment to the security of the Gulf will be vital to oil market stability in the coming(prenominal) (Keiswetter, 2012 2). It could be said, thus, that the main challenge for the U.S. here will be being able to maintain traditional allies while supporting the democratic values it has been forever defending.Second, while a U.S. presence throughout the region and close cooperation with partner governments security services may be necessary for combating terrorism, this American military presence in the Arab world will continue to go away extremist s with propaganda and recruitment opportunities (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51). The Arab Spring uprisings, based on universal values and rooted in the demand for jobs, justice and dignity, high lightheaded the bankruptcy of Islamic extremism sanctioning violence as the only way to obtain societal changes (Keiswetter, 2012 2). While none of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East was led by Islamist movements or had an Islamist agenda (Dalacoura, 2012 74), Islamist movements have proved to benefit from them politically (ibid 75). Indeed, the upheavals provide opportunities, as it happened in Yemen, for Islamic extremists to gain ground (Keiswetter, 2012 2). As exemplified in front with the case of Egypt, the U.S. faces the challenge of having Islamist regimes freely elected in stagnant countries, whereby radical movements are like to mushroom, or take an active role in the next political direction of the region, which will probably lead to international criticism.Third, tilting toward Is rael in the Palestinian conflict may be essential to tell Washingtons commitment to Israels security (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50). However, Israeli leadership argue that the wave of unrest in the Arab world is endangering Israels security by potentially replacing relatively friendly neighboring governments with Islamist and potentially hostile governments (Arieff et al., 2012 3).Fourth, a forceful military U.S. intervention in Syria could speed up the demise of Assads regime, reduce humanitarian suffering, demonstrate leadership, and weaken Iran. However, such intervention would also require a major investment of military resources, returning the US to the protracted commitment that it just escaped in Iraq, and consuming resources necessary to deal with Iran and other global contingencies (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 50).Fifth, the unclear prospects for democratic change. The consensus in Washington from the 1990s has been that democratization will lead to the emergence in the Middle East of regimes which are supportive of the U.S. (Dalacoura, 2012 78). However, the Middle East has been described as immune to the waves of democratization which have transformed other regions. Moreover, focusing attention on democracy in the Middle East has been criticized for reflecting the priorities of western and in particular American political science (ibid 71). On political and economic reform, the nature of the democratic political systems in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya be to be seen (Keiswetter, 2012 2). Indeed, one of the U.S. greatest venerates is credibility in what new Middle East will emerge from the current turmoil (Shore, 2012).Sixth, it can be said that Irans nuclear and regional hegemonic aspirations are one of the major pre-Arab Spring concerns for the US. It is feared that a nuclear-armed Tehran would increase its support for militancy, terrorism, and subversion in the Levant, Iraq, and the Gulf, which would further destabilize the region (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). T hus, Irans nuclear program could have a decisive impact on regional politics (ibid.).Seventh, the Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. Both the U.S. and Europe are missing the necessary financial resources to shape prospects in the Arab Spring countries. Thus, investment will also have to come from countries, such as the Gulf states or China, who do not share to the same extent the Hesperian interest in reinforcement of democratic values (Keiswetter, 2012 2).In any case, the ultimate strategic effects of these changes are not clear. Many fear the emerging power of Islamist movements, elected or violent (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 43). The anti-American protests in September 2012 in response to a YouTube video, and the uneven governmental responses to the crisis were a clear sign of the underlying turbulence which might complicate future U.S. policy in the region. In other words, the emerging regional order combines a complex array of contradictory new tr ends (ibid.).In light of the Arab uprisings, it is highly important to prioritize political and economic reform. However, pushing reform complicates ties with key autocratic partners, may cause a nationalist reverberation in some democratizing states, and may also risk empowering Islamist groups less devoted to cooperate with the US (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 51).ConclusionA major question that carcass to be answered is whether the uprisings will eventually lead to the democratization of the Middle East and the end of the despotism that has undermined its political life (Dalacoura, 2012 79).On the one hand, the most immediate prospects for the Arab Spring are continuing instabilities as states try to solve their political and economic situations, as well as their relations with other countries rising enchant for those countries with the necessary resources to back up their policies and the continuation of a visible but attenuated role for the U.S. (Keiswetter, 2012 2). The long-term prospect, on the other hand, includes also the misfortune Middle East with a much higher degree of freedom, more democratic, prosperous and accountable, less abusive of human rights, and thus a net positive outcome for U.S. interests (ibid.). With the dramatic rise in popular activism appoint by the new technologies, it is clear that long-term stability in the region will require meaningful steps by all governments towards a genuine political and economic reform (Kahl and Lynch, 2013 42). The U.S. has had to tread a fine line between support for its values and long-term interests represented by political reform in the region-, and the protection of its core regional interests (Kitchen, 2012 57).If the U.S. is heavy about turning off its Middle detour, then in the Middle East and North Africa the US needs to prioritize long-term trends over short-term concerns, which may not always mean pushing for revolutionary change in support of democratic values in the region (Kitchen, 2012 58).The recent revolutions pose an opportunity to establish a new status quo in the Middle East, free an oppressed and jobless youth, increase economic standing and trade, and give democracy a chance to flourish. 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